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Non–technical Summary
There is a long debate on the role of market leaders in investing in R&D.
Following Arrow (1962), a popular view regards competitive pressure as be-
ing supportive for innovative activity and that incumbents tend to be less
innovative than outsiders. In this paper, we reconsider this view both from
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. A theoretical model provides
hypotheses on the incentives to invest in R&D for incumbent leaders and
outsiders. It establishes the crucial role of entry pressure on the behavior of
leaders and followers. In markets with free entry each firm tends to invest
less, but when the incumbents have a leadership position in the competition
for the market, they tend to invest more than the average firm. Hence, we
obtain the exact opposite of the commonly held view associated with Arrow.
We also show that these theoretical results are robust to different model
specifications.
Our theoretically derived hypotheses are tested with a sample of German
manufacturing firms. We study R&D intensity at the firm level, and the
novel aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the compa-
nies provided a subjective view on our key determinants: entry pressure and
the identification of market leaders. Control variables include employment,
capital intensity, a measure of the firms’ patent stock, the Herfindahl index
of concentration and sector dummies. The independence of the entry vari-
able from the dependent variable, R&D intensity, is supported through an
instrumental variable analysis and a number of exogeneity tests.
We find strong empirical evidence for our main predictions: entry pressure
reduces the average investment per firm, but incumbent leaders invest more
than other firms when they are pressured by a strong threat of entry. This
implies that we may have to change our way of looking at persistent market
dominance: this may be the result of strong competitive pressure rather than
of market power.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze (Summary in German)
Seit langem wird u¨ber die Rolle von Marktfu¨hrern bei Forschungs- und Ent-
wicklungsausgaben diskutiert. In Anschluss an Arrow (1962) ist die Mei-
nung weit verbreitet, dass sich Wettbewerbsdruck positiv auf Innovations-
aktivita¨ten auswirkt, und Marktfu¨hrer weniger innovativ sind als kleinere
Konkurrenzunternehmen. In dieser Arbeit u¨berdenken wir diese Sichtweise.
Wir entwicklen ein theoretisches Modell zu den Anreizen, in Forschungs-
und Entwicklungsaktivita¨ten zu investieren. Insbesondere unterstreicht die-
ses Modell die Bedeutung von Marktzutrittsmo¨glichkeiten. Bei freiem Markt-
zutritt investiert jede Firma weniger, aber die Marktfu¨hrer investieren mehr
als andere Firmen. Wir erhalten folglich genau das entgegengesetzte Ergebnis
von Arrow. Wir zeigen, dass diese theoretischen Ergebnisse robust gegenu¨ber
Modellvariationen sind.
Die aus der Theorie hergeleiteten Hypothesen werden mit Daten deut-
scher Firmen empirisch u¨berpru¨ft. Wir analysieren die Forschungs- und Ent-
wicklungsintensita¨t auf der Unternehmensebene, wobei ein neuer Aspekt un-
serer Untersuchung die Art der Beru¨cksichtigung von Marktzutrittsbarrieren
und der Identifikation von Marktfu¨hrern ist: beide Variablen basieren auf
Selbsteinscha¨tzung der jeweiligen Firmen fu¨r ihren relevanten Markt. Kon-
trollvariablen sind Bescha¨ftigung, Kapitalintensita¨t, der Patentbestand auf
Unternehmensebene, Herfindahl–Konzentrationsindex sowie Branchendum-
mies.
Exogenita¨tstests zeigen, dass die Marktzutrittsvariable von den FuE–
Aufwendungen unabha¨ngig ist. Unsere theoretischen Hypothesen werden durch
die empirische Evidenz unterstu¨tzt: Bei freiem Marktzutritt investieren Un-
ternehmen im Durchschnitt weniger in FuE. Marktfu¨hrer investieren jedoch
mehr als andere Unternehmen, wenn ihre Position stark duch Marktzutritt
bedroht wird. Die Ergebnisse fu¨hren zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass die weit-
verbreitete Ansicht u¨ber dauerhafte Dominanz in Ma¨rkten u¨berdacht werden
sollte. Fortdauernde Marktfu¨hrerschaft kann das Ergebnis von starkem po-
tenziellen Wettbewerbsdruck sein und muss nicht von Marktmacht herru¨hren.
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Abstract
We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, con-
trary to the Arrow view, endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average
firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more. We test
these predictions with a Tobit model based on a unique dataset and survey for the
German manufacturing sector (the Mannheim Innovation Panel). We confirm the
empirical validity of our predictions and perform a number of robustness test with
instrumental variables.
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1 Introduction
There is a lot of debate on the role of market leaders in investing in R&D and
promoting technological progress. A commonly held view is that firms invest
more in a more competitive market where the entry pressure is stronger,
and incumbents tend to be less innovative than their followers, so that the
persistence of their dominance is typically the signal of market power and of
the lack of entry pressure. This view is often associated with Arrow (1962),
who has shown that incumbents have lower incentives to invest in R&D than
the outsiders, and that in case of free entry in the competition for the market
they do not invest at all, leaving the innovative activity to the outsiders.
In this paper we challenge this view both from a theoretical and empirical
perspective. First, we develop the simplest theoretical model able to provide
clear cut results on the incentives to invest in R&D for incumbent leaders and
outsiders. The model is in the tradition of the recent works on endogenous
market structures and market leadership,2 and shows the crucial role of entry
pressure on the different behavior of leaders and followers. In markets where
entry can be regarded as endogenous, in the sense that entry occurs if there
are profitable opportunities and the existing firms are threatened by the
entry pressure, each firm tends to invest less, but when the incumbents have
a leadership in the competition for the market, they tend to invest more
than the average firm. In other words, we obtain the exact opposite of the
commonly held view associated with Arrow: entry pressure leads the average
firm to invest less and the incumbent leader to invest more, which ultimately
leads to a surprising association between entry pressure and persistence of
leadership through innovations. We also show that these theoretical results
are robust to different model specifications, in particular they hold in general
patent races (as in Etro, 2004, 2008), and in models of preliminary investment
in cost reducing R&D as a strategic commitment for the competition in the
market (as in Etro, 2006).
2See Etro (2007) for a review of this literature.
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We bring to the data the two basic predictions of our model: endogenous
entry threats induce the average firms to invest less in R&D and the incum-
bent leaders to invest more.3 We test these hypothesis through a Tobit model
for R&D intensity. Our empirical investigation is based on a unique dataset
on the German manufacturing sector, the Mannheim Innovation Panel from
2005, which includes a wide number of firm level data and answers to a sur-
vey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) with
a special focus on innovation. A novel aspect of our empirical approach is
given by the fact that the same firms provide a subjective view on our key de-
terminants of R&D intensity, the entry pressure and the leadership. Rather
than determining arbitrarily the size and composition of a market, assigning
a degree of entry intensity in a discretionary way, and assigning a status of
leadership on the basis of predetermined variables, using the questionnaire
of the Mannheim Innovation Panel we allow the firms to identify the size
of their main market, the existence of an endogenous threat of entry in the
market and the identity of the leader in the market. Control variables include
employment, capital intensity, a measure of the patent stock, the Herfindahl
index of concentration and sector dummies. The independence of the entry
variable from the dependent variable R&D intensity is supported through an
instrumental variable analysis and a number of exogeneity tests. Our main
predictions are strongly supported by the empirical evidence: entry pressure
reduces the average investment per firm, but incumbent leaders invest more
than other firms when they are pressured by a strong threat of entry.
These results can be interpreted as a preliminary attempt to test the main
predictions of the endogenous market structures approach, that analyzes the
role of firms in markets where entry is endogenous. In this case, the behavior
of incumbent leaders is radically different depending on the entry conditions,
and the conclusions of the cited approach appear to be confirmed empirically.
At a policy level, the results suggest also that we may have to change our
3For an alternative empirical investigation of the same result see Adams and Clemmons
(2008).
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way of looking at persistent dominance in technologically advanced markets:
this may be the result of strong competitive pressures rather than of market
power.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the theoretical
model and derives the empirical prediction, Section 2 provides the empirical
evidence, and Section 3 concludes.
2 A Model of R&D Investment
The aim of this section is to provide theoretical motivation for our testable
predictions. With this purpose in mind, we first develop the simplest model
that leads to our main results, and then we sketch other theoretical frame-
works that support the same predictions.
Let us consider a simple contest between N firms to obtain a drastic
innovation which provides a flow of profits V ∈ (0, 1) for the winner and
generates no gains for the losers. Each contestant i bears fixed costs F and
invests variable resources that lead to the probability of innovation zi ∈ [0, 1].
For simplicity we assume that the cost of the R&D activity is quadratic in
zi, that is dz
2
i /2, where the constant d parameterizes the marginal cost of
investing in R&D.4 We can think of the fixed cost as the investment necessary
to be engaged in R&D activity (i.e.: a laboratory), and of the variable cost
as the rate of investment in R&D spending.
R&D investment provides the contestant with the probability zi to inno-
vate. If multiple firms innovate at the same time, competition in the market
drives their profits to zero, therefore only in case of a single innovator, the
contest has a winner. Summing up, the expected profit function of a generic
contestant i is:
E(Pi) = zi(1− zI)
∏N
j=1,j 6=i [1− zj]V −
dz2i
2
− F (1)
4This is what emerges in case of a Cobb-Douglas innovation function employing capital
ki and labor li, as zi = kαi l
β
i with α+ β = 1/2.
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where the first term is the expected gain from innovating and the second term
is the cost of the R&D investment. The probability of winning the contest
for firm i is the probability of innovating zi multiplied by the probability that
no other firm (including the incumbent) innovates,
∏
j 6=i (1− zj). With this
probability, the contestant obtains the award V .
2.1 Entry and R&D investment
In this section we evaluate the impact of entry on the investment level of
each firm in Nash equilibrium. The first order conditions for the investment
choice of each firm can be written as follows in a symmetric equilibrium:
z =
(1− z)N−1V
d
(2)
Even if this is an implicit expression for the equilibrium investment, its total
differentiation shows that R&D investments per firm is a decreasing function
of the number of firms (∂z/∂N < 0). Of course, total investment is increasing
in entry, but the individual impact of an increase in the number of firms
is always negative. Moreover, the investment of each firm is increasing in
the value of the innovation V and decreasing in the marginal cost of the
investment (in d), while it is independent from the fixed cost F .
Let us move to the analysis of the endogenous entry case. Since entry
reduces the expected gross profits and at some point these become smaller
than the fixed cost, we can characterize the endogenous market structure
emerging when the number of potential entrants is high enough. Firms enter
until the following zero profit condition holds:
z(1− z)N−1V = dz
2
2
+ F (3)
This implies that, in the endogenous market structure each entrant invests:
z =
√
2F
d
(4)
4
Our conclusions on the impact of entry on R&D spending per firm are
unambiguous: this is reduced with entry and it is definitely lower when entry
is endogenous compared to the case of an exogenous number of firms that
does not exhaust the profit opportunities in the industry. Summing up,
these results can be translated as follows: the investment of the average firm
is lower when the entry threat is endogenous.
The equilibrium investment with endogenous entry does not depend any-
more on the value of the innovation (which increases the number of individual
investors), but it is now increasing in the fixed costs of entry, and remains
decreasing in the parameter that measures the marginal cost of investment.
We can think of the marginal cost of investment as an inverse function of the
human resources of the firm: a larger pool of workers reduces the marginal
cost of research and therefore it corresponds to a lower d. Accordingly, we
could obtain the collateral prediction that the equilibrium investment is in-
creasing in the size of the labor force (∂z/∂d < 0) and it is increasing in a
less than proportional way (∂2z/∂d2 > 0).
2.2 Leadership and R&D investment
Let us now introduce an incumbent leader in this model. Such a firm is
defined as one that is perceived in the market as the larger incumbent firm
and that is able to commit before the others to certain investment decisions.
In our model the market leader is engaged in the same kind of investment
as the other firms, but can exploit its leadership to obtain extra profits pi > 0
compared to the other firms in a preliminary period, and retain the same
profits in case no one innovates. Therefore, the expected profits of the leader
are:
E(PI) = pi + zI
∏N
j=1
[1− zj]V + (1− zI)
∏N
j=1
[1− zj] pi − dz
2
I
2
− F (5)
in case of positive investment in the contest - otherwise expected profits are
given only by the current profits plus the expected value of the current profits
when no one innovates. We are interested in Stackelberg equilibrium where
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the leader decides how much to invest and subsequently the other firms take
the same decision independently.
First of all, notice that in the presence of an exogenous number of out-
siders, there are two effects on the investment of the incumbent leader. On
one side, the Arrow effect leads to a lower investment compared to the fol-
lowers because the incumbent leader has less to gain from innovating. On the
other side we have a Stackelberg effect, which in this framework characterized
by strategic substitutability works in the opposite direction. Nevertheless,
as long as the current profits of the leader are high enough, the first effect
prevails and the incumbent leader invests less than the average firm.5
If we want to compare the differential impact on R&D spending of be-
ing a leader when entry is endogenous, we need to derive the Stackelberg
equilibrium with endogenous entry for this contest. First of all, notice that,
as long as the investment of the leader zI is small enough to allow entry of
some followers, the endogenous entry condition delivers again the investment
z =
√
2F/d for each outsider firm, and the endogenous number of active
followers is:
N(zI) = 1 +
log
[
(1− zI)V/
√
2dF
]
log
[
1/(1−
√
2F/d)
]
Putting together these two equilibrium conditions in the profit function of
the leader, we would have the following expected profits of the incumbent
leader:
E(PI) = pi + d
( zI
1− zI +
pi
V
)√
2F
d
1−
√
2F
d
− z2I
2
− F (6)
which is always increasing in the investment of the leader. Therefore, in this
simple example, profit maximization generates a corner solution such that
5For instance, with d = 1 and N = 2 we have:
zI =
V pi + (1− V )(V − pi)
1− 2V (V − pi) z =
V pi + (1− V )V − V 3
1− 2V (V − pi)
and the Arrow effect prevails on the Stackelberg effect whenever pi > V 3/(1− V ).
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no outsiders enter. Since N(zI) = 1 requires log [(1− zI)V/dz] = 0, we can
conclude that the leader invests:
zI = 1−
√
2dF
V
>
√
2F
d
(7)
When the monopolist is the leader in the competition for the innovation,
the Arrow effect disappears, because the choice of the monopolist is indepen-
dent from the current profits.6 Notice that the investment of the leader is
increasing in the expected flow of profits V (more expected profits require a
larger investment to deter entry of the outsiders). Moreover, the investment
is still decreasing in d, and is now decreasing in the fixed cost of entry of the
other firms (which reduces the investment needed to deter entry).
The interest of this extreme result emerges when we compare it to the
case in which the incumbent has not a first mover advantage. In such a
case, the standard Arrow effect leads to the opposite result: the incumbent
does not invest at all and only the outsiders invest and possibly innovate.
Summing up, there are two sufficient conditions under which monopolists
have incentives to invest in R&D and to invest more than other firms: 1)
leadership for the incumbent leader and 2) endogenous entry for the outsiders
in the race to innovate. This result shows a clear contrast with what we
expect for the average firms, and provides an empirical discriminant between
the investment of the incumbent leaders and that of the average firms: the
former should be larger than the latter if and only if there is a constant threat
of entry in the market.
The main empirical prediction of our simple model are not model specific,
and they can be found in much more general models of patent races and of
preliminary investment in R&D as a strategic commitment for the competi-
tion in the market. To convince the reader of this, we will briefly provide a
couple of examples.
6See De Bondt and Vandekerckhove (2007) for further extensions of this result to the
case of R&D spillovers between firms.
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2.3 A general patent race
A wide literature on R&D investments (started by Dasgupta and Stiglitz,
1980) has studied patent races where the investment zi generates innovations
according to a Poisson process with an arrival rate given by a function h(zi)
eventually exhibiting decreasing returns to scale, so that the expected value of
innovating for an average firm is h(zi)V/ [r +
∑
h(zj)] where r is the interest
rate. In such a case, one can verify that entry reduces always the investment
of the average firm, and Etro (2004, 2008) has shown that when entry is
endogenous the incumbent leader invests always more than any other single
firm. However, in this model entry of outsiders occurs and is not deterred
by the leader. For instance, in case of linear variable costs of investment dzi,
the R&D investment of the average firm z and of the incumbent leader zI
satisfy:
h′(z)
V − F − z
V
= h′(zI) =
dh(z)
z + F
(8)
which confirms that zI > z and that the investment of every firm is increasing
in any factor that reduces the marginal cost of investment d (typically the size
of employment). This confirms the validity of the main empirical predictions
of our basic model.
2.4 Strategic investment in R&D
Similar results have been developed in models of R&D spending as a strategic
investment preliminary to the competition in the market. In these models,
R&D spending per firm is typically decreasing with the number of firms,
which confirms our earlier results. Moreover, the investment of the incumbent
leaders is radically different according to whether entry is endogenous or not.
Etro (2006) has shown that investments in cost reductions aimed at reducing
the price of a good give rise to neat predictions: in particular, market leaders
should spend less than the other firms in R&D investments in cost reductions
when the number of firms is exogenous, and they should spend more when
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entry is endogenous.7 More generally, as shown in Etro (2006) and Maci
and Zigic (2008), the leadership generates always strategic overinvestment in
R&D relative to sales when entry is endogenous.
2.5 Testable predictions
Our overview of simple and general theoretical models of the incentives to
invest in R&D emphasizes two conclusions that appear robust to alternative
modeling specifications. They can be summarized as follows:
Hp. 1: R&D intensity of the average firm is lower when entry
is endogenous.
Hp. 2: R&D intensity of the incumbent leader is larger than
the investment of the average firm when entry is endogenous.
The first hypothesis suggests a negative relation between the threat of
entry perceived by the firms and their rate of investment in R&D, and it
derives from the strengthening of competition for the market induced by
entry. The second one is our main interest because it is in radical contrast
7One should keep in mind that this result holds under competition in prices, while
under competition in quantities the leader would generally spend more than the followers
in cost reductions under both entry conditions: nevertheless, also in such a case, entry
would increase the investment of the leader. To verify the last result, let us briefly consider
a model of Cournot competition with inverse demand p = a−X between an incumbent
leader with marginal cost c(zI) = c−
√
zI/d, with d > 1, affected by its investment zI and
N other firms with a constant marginal cost c. The Cournot equilibrium and the optimal
(interior) investment of the incumbent leader can be easily derived in case of an exogenous
number of firms and with endogenous entry. In the latter case, we have xI = d
√
F/(d−1)
and x =
√
F with the strategic investment of the leader: zI = dk(d−1)2which implies the
following rule for the optimal ratio between R&D spending zI and sales of the leader pxI :
R&D
Sales
=
√
F
(d− 1) (c+√F )
This result is expressed in terms of a commonly used ratio in empirical work on innovation,
and it supports again the comparative statics of our simple model.
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with the Arrowian view of the incumbent leaders as firms investing less than
the other firms in R&D. According to our models, these leaders should invest
more than the other firms if and only if they face a strong threat of entry
pressure.
3 Empirical Test
In this section, we perform a simple empirical test on whether actual firm-
level investment data support our hypotheses derived from the theoretical
framework.
3.1 Data sources
We use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) from the year
2005. This innovation survey has been conducted by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, and covers a representative sample
of the German manufacturing sector as well as business related services. For
our study, we focus on the manufacturing sector. The 2005 spell of the
MIP included some unique questions allowing to model entry threats and to
identify leaders/incumbents.
The database has a cross-sectional structure, but the questionnaire col-
lects information generally for the years 2002 to 2004. The quantitative
variables, such as R&D investment, capital, employment, sales etc., are sur-
veyed for a certain year. For instance, R&D investment is only collected
for the year 2004. Other information that we use as controls are, however,
collected for the two years 2003 and 2004, so that we can make use of lagged
controls to avoid direct simultaneity bias in the regressions. Qualitative in-
formation, such as the competitive situation in a firm’s main market, the
firm’s competitive position etc., are collected through one question each re-
ferring to the time period 2002–2004. We will use the qualitative information
to construct variables on incumbency and entry threats during this period,
10
and argue that the situation between 2002 and 2004 will have an impact on
strategic investment behavior in 2004.
The dependent variable of our analysis is the R&D intensity in the year
2004 at the firm level. The intensity is defined as R&D divided by sales
(RDINTi = R&Di/SALESi × 100).
The most important right-hand side variables are the entry threat and the
leadership position. An innovative aspect of our empirical approach is given
by the fact that the same firms provide a subjective view on these two factors:
rather than assigning a degree of entry intensity in a discretionary way or
assigning a status of leadership on the basis of predetermined variables, we
allow the firms to identify the existence of an endogenous threat of entry in
the market and the identity of the leader in the market.
The survey asked for several characteristics about the competitive situa-
tion in firms’ main product markets in the time period 2002–2004. In partic-
ular, firms were asked to indicate if a list of six statements about the firms
competitive environment apply to their situation or not. The response was
based on a 4–point Likert scale, from “applies strongly” to “does not apply
at all”. Thus, our variable of entry threat, ENTRYi, is an ordinal variable
taking values from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates that the respondent firm strongly
agreed to the statement that its market position is highly threatened by en-
try. When this is the case, we conjecture that entry in the industry where
the firm is active can be regarded as endogenous; when the firm does not
consider the threat of entry as present in its industry, this is regarded as one
with an exogenous number of firms. As found in the theoretical framework
(Hp. 1), we expect a negative sign of ENTRYi in the regressions for the
average R&D intensity.
The theoretical definition of a market leader is associated with a strate-
gic first mover advantage, but a more general definition can be based on
the leading strategic position of the firm compared to its main competitors.
Therefore, our incumbent variable is defined through a question on a firms’
position compared to its main competitors. The respondents indicated if
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their competitors are larger, smaller, similar size, or larger and smaller than
their firm. Consequently, an incumbent leader in our analysis is identified by
an indicator variable, LEADERi, describing a firm that is larger than the
competitors in its main product market.
While we expect that entry has a negative impact on investment in gen-
eral, the theoretical framework shows that incumbents choose to invest more
than other contestants if their market is threatened by entry (Hp. 2). We
capture this by an interaction term of leadership and entry (LEADERi ×
ENTRYi).
As outlined in the theoretical model, it is desirable to control for em-
ployment and capital requirement. We include firms’ employment in t − 1
(EMPi,t−1) as well as capital intensity (KAPINTi,t−1) in the empirical model
to account for such impacts on investment decision. For the size of the
employment we expect a positive and concave relation on the basis of our
theoretical work. Concerning the role of capital intensity, we noticed that
theoretical results are model–specific. Thus, we do not have strong priors
on the sign of the coefficient of capital intensity. We also control for the
Herfindahl index of concentration of the industry where the firm is active.
Finally, we used twelve industry dummies to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity in investment across industries. The industries are: Food, Tex-
tiles, Paper/Publishing, Chemicals, Rubber, Glass/Ceramics, Metal, Ma-
chinery, Electronics, Information & Communication Technology, Instruments/
Optics and Vehicles.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of core variables used in the up-
coming regression analysis. In total, we can use 1,908 observations for the
empirical study. The average R&D intensity of firms is about 2.3% and av-
erage firms size amounts to 307 employees in the sample. 8% of all firms are
classified as incumbents.
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R&D and unobserved firm heterogeneity
While we believe that our unique survey data offer some interesting new
insights about the empirical modeling of investment decision under entry
threats, one may be concerned that we do not have panel data to control
for unobserved heterogeneity.8 However, we can offer one robustness check
that might account for unobserved heterogeneity to a large extent. We are
able to construct a patent stock at the firm level accounting for all patent
application from 1978 onwards. While patents are certainly not a perfect
measure (see e.g. Griliches, 1991), we believe that the patent stock proxies
past R&D efforts of a firm to a large extent.
In particular, we compute the patent stock using the perpetual inventory
method for each firm. The survey data has been merged with the database
from the German Patent Office which covers all patents filed at both the
German and the European Patent Office since 1978. We follow the common
practice in the literature and impose a rate of obsolescence of 15% per year
when computing the patent stock (see e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). In-
cluding such a rate of obsolescence implies, quite realistically that knowledge
loses its relevance similarly as capital depreciates over time. The variable
PSTOCK is given by
PSTOCKit = (1− δ)PSTOCKi,t−1 + PAit,
where δ = 0.15, and PAit denotes patent applications of firm i in year t. We
set the initial patent stock in year 1978 to zero for all firms. Since we use
data from 2002-2004 in our regressions, the bias arising from a zero starting
value will have disappeared due to the included depreciation rate δ.
8While we certainly agree that it would add to the robustness of our results if we had
panel data, the information we use is just not existing for multiple time periods in the
survey (yet).
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Potential feedback from R&D to entry threat
In our empirical investigation we proxy the threat of entry in the market
where each firm is active with the perception of the firm as collected in our
survey data. This shortcut avoids the need of investigating what are the
determinants of the fact that a market is characterized or not by endogenous
entry as opposed to being limited to an exogenous number of firms. A main
concern relies in the independence of our entry variable from the dependent
variable. It is possible that current R&D leading to a future technological
advantage makes firms perceive the entry threat as less severe. To the con-
trary, if firms are not research active and neglect the development of new
processes and products, entry may appear as a quite realistic threat. Sutton
(1998, 2006) characterizes R&D as a strategic factor, which is used by some
companies to determine the market structure. He also shows what factors
determine the role of R&D as a strategic variable to deter entry. At least the
possibility of a reverse relationship has to be investigated. We experimented
with a number of candidates for instrumental variables as outlined in the
following paragraphs.
To find instrumental variables that explain our entry variable but not the
R&D intensity variable, we need to look at the main factor that attracts entry,
the difference between the expected profits in the market and the fixed costs
of entry. Many empirical studies have emphasized the role of profitability
for entry and market growth.9 One would expect that entry occurs more
frequently in markets where profitability is expected to be high, and less
frequently when profitability is expected to be low. We use a proxy for the
opposite of profitability, namely the percentage of defaults out of the total
number of firms in an industry as a variable standing for risk in an industry.
The number of defaults is obtained from Creditreform, the largest German
credit rating agency. This serves as an indicator of an industry with turmoil
(Defaultt−1).10 We expect a negative impact of the default probability of
9A recent example is Berger et al. (2004).
10This variable should be interpreted as an index only. The default data we have concern
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the existing firms on entry rates.11
Let us move to the fixed costs of entry as a (negative) determinant of
entry. There is a well developed theoretical and empirical literature on the
so-called barriers to entry. The empirical studies on entry barriers address
the question of natural barriers, like scale economies, and strategic barriers
for instance excess capacity, limit pricing, product differentiation by means
of advertising or also innovative activity. Economies of scale are frequently
regarded as a cause of entry barriers. In practice it is not trivial to identify
scale economies. Sutton (1998) uses the size of the median plant in an indus-
try as a proxy for minimum efficient scale. In other studies variants of size
measures are used, but most studies rely on observed size as it is very difficult
to get information on the minimum efficient size required by the technology
used.12 We have no information on the median firm, but know total industry
sales and the number of firms active therein. This information is taken from
official statistics and measured at a detailed industry level (NACE 3-digit
level). The ratio, industry sales per firm, is applied as a proxy for minimum
efficient scale and enters the regressions as lagged value (MESt−1).
Sutton (1998, 2006) also emphasizes the importance of substitutability
among products. If products are homogenous (in the Sutton terminology a
high α-industry), an entrant offering a product with a higher quality, cap-
tures a relatively large market share as many consumers are interested in
a superior product. In contrast, if products are distant substitutes (low α-
industry) a firm investing in improved product quality will only gain a small
share of the industry sales as consumer preferences are very heterogenous.
all defaults in a given industry. However, the total number of firms stems from official
statistics that only account for firms above 20 employees. Therefore the ratio should not
be interpreted as the exact percentage of bankruptcies in an industry.
11However, Geroski (1995) points to empirical evidence from the UK that entry and exit
rates are positively correlated, which is difficult to reconcile with the static profitability
interpretation.
12Lyons et al. (2001) use engineering estimates based on the firms’ technologies employed
in the production process.
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Hence product substitutability is a determinant of entry barriers, with higher
substitutability supporting entry.13
The 2005 MIP questionnaire also collects information on the relation be-
tween products. The respective question is “Please indicate to what extent
the following characteristics describe the competitive environment in your
main market.” One characteristic is “Products of rivals are easily substi-
tutable with ours.” The evaluations are rated by use of a four point Likert
scale ranging from “applies entirely” to “does not apply at all”, which we
transform into four dummy variables. Three of them are included in the first
stage regression (SUB2 to SUB4).
Clearly, the demand for a product will affect entry, and demand for a
product may in turn be affected by advertising intensity. For our purpose, it
is not relevant whether advertising is informative or has a direct impact on
preferences. In both cases demand reacts to advertising. The survey collected
information on the importance of advertising. Firms were asked to rank
the importance of several characteristics of their competitive environment
(product quality, technological advance, service, product variety, advertising
and price) where they are active. Thus we translate the variable into a
series of six dummy variables indicating the importance of advertising for
the firm’s business strategy (ADV 2 to ADV 6). Descriptive statistics for the
instrumental variables are reported in Table 1 as well.
13Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) analyze a game where firms choose whether to enter
or not at the first stage of the game, choose quality at the second stage and prices at the
third stage. Surprisingly they show in their model that only a few and in the limit only
one firm will operate in the industry despite of endogenous entry.
16
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1,857 observations)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
RDINTit 2.271 5.112 0 38.914
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.307 1.356 0.001 36.761
KAPINTi,t−1 0.078 0.090 0.001 0.861
LEADERit 0.080 0.271 0 1
ENTRYit 1.531 0.851 0 3
HHIi,t−1 36.778 61.022 3.15 650.17
PSTOCKi,t−1/(EMPi,t−1/1000) 8.864 26.906 0 222.447
IV candidates
DEFAULTt−1 22.834 16.246 0 80.924
MESt−1 0.079 0.166 0.009 2.102
SUB2it 0.246 0.431 0 1
SUB3it 0.450 0.498 0 1
SUB4it 0.237 0.425 0 1
ADV 2it 0.061 0.239 0 1
ADV 3it 0.137 0.344 0 1
ADV 4it 0.129 0.336 0 1
ADV 5it 0.184 0.387 0 1
ADV 6it 0.464 0.499 0 1
3.2 Econometric Analysis
As not all firms invest in R&D, we estimate Tobit models that take account
for the left censoring of the dependent variable. The Tobit model to be esti-
mated can be written as:
RDINT ∗i = X
′
iβ + εi (9)
where RDINT ∗i is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent
variable is equal to:
RDINTi =
 RDINT ∗i if X ′iβ + εi > 00 otherwise (10)
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Xi represents the matrix of regressors, β the parameters to be estimated, and
εi the random error term. In our basic specification, Xi includes EMPi,t−1,
EMP 2i,t−1,KAPINTi,t−1, LEADERit, ENTRYit as well as 12 industry dum-
mies. In further models, we add the interaction term LEADERi×ENTRYi,
and the patent stock to control for previous R&D.
We first consider homoscedastic regressions, and subsequently test for
heteroscedasticity as coefficient estimates may be inconsistent if the assump-
tions of homoscedasticity is violated in Tobit models. In order to esti-
mate heteroscedastic Tobits, the homoscedastic variance σ is replaced with
σi = σ exp(Z
′
iα) in the likelihood function (see Greene, 2003, pp. 768–9).
We consider groupwise multiplicative heteroscedasticity by using a set of
five size dummies (based on employment) and the industry dummies in the
heteroscedasticity term.
Table 2 shows the regression results for homoscedastic models, and Table
3 for the heteroscedastic models. In the homoscedastic Tobit Model I, we
find that R&D investment decreases as the threat of entry increases. The
leaders’ investment does not differ from that of the outsiders. When we add
the interaction term of leadership and entry threat (See Model II), however,
interesting differences occur. While the leader dummy is still insignificant,
we now find that leaders who are faced by potential entry invest more than
the outsiders. The results remain robust when we control for prior R&D
using the patent stock. The patent stock is highly significant and positive,
i.e. firms that (successfully) conducted R&D in the past will also invest more
in the current period.
With respect to the other covariates, we find a positive and concave re-
lation with employment.14 Capital intensity is positively significant in all
models, and the Herfindahl index is always insignificant. Furthermore there
are differences in R&D investment across industries. The industry dummies
are always jointly different from zero in the regressions, and our results em-
14The inverted U curve peaks at about 20 thsd. employees. As we have only a single
observation that has more employees, we can basically conclude that R&D investment is
increasing and concave in firm size.
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phasize a high correlation of R&D spending with firms of the Information &
Communication Technology.
Table 2: Homoscedastic Tobit models on R&D intensity (1,857 observations)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.840∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.267) (0.260)
(EMPi,t−1/1000)2 −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.019∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
KAPINTi,t−1 4.126∗∗ 4.039∗∗ 3.621∗
(2.066) (2.065) (2.017)
HHIi,t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PSTOCKi,t−1 0.050∗∗∗
(0.006)
LEADERit −0.099 −0.161 −0.298
(0.676) (0.676) (0.660)
ENTRYit −0.598∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.246) (0.240)
ENTRYit ∗ LEADERit 0.541∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗
(0.217) (0.212)
Intercept −4.788∗∗∗ −4.844∗∗∗ −4.816∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.939) (0.915)
Industry dummies χ2(12) 304.69∗∗∗ 298.33∗∗∗ 239.66∗∗∗
Log–Likelihood −3769.18 −3766.07 −3735.12
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicate a significance level
of 1% (5%, 10%).
As Table 3 shows, the assumption of homoscedasticity is rejected for all
models (see Wald tests on heteroscedasticity). The industry and firm size
dummies are always jointly significant in the variance equation. However, our
main results are robust to the model modification. Leaders, in general, are
still not differently investing in R&D than the outsiders, and R&D investment
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is negatively affected by the entry variable. Leaders that suffer from entry
threat also invest more than outsiders in the heteroscedastic version.
Table 3: Heteroscedastic Tobit models on R&D intensity (1,857 observations)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.625∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.111) (0.112)
(EMPi,t−1/1000)2 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
KAPINTi,t−1 1.047 1.037 1.031
(0.919) (0.927) (0.924)
HHIi,t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PSTOCKi,t−1 0.032∗∗∗
(0.005)
LEADERit 0.147 0.135 0.045
(0.271) (0.269) (0.271)
ENTRYit −0.203∗ −0.322∗∗ −0.317∗∗
(0.120) (0.130) (0.128)
ENTRYit ∗ LEADERit 0.302∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗
(0.115) (0.114)
Intercept −0.802∗∗ −0.909∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.334) (0.338)
Industry dummies: χ2(12) 143.09∗∗∗ 142.86∗∗∗ 109.11∗∗∗
Log–Likelihood −3533.40 −3529.90 −3511.60
Wald Test on
heteroscedasticity: χ2(17) 534.22∗∗∗ 530.71∗∗∗ 514.14∗∗∗
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicate a significance level
of 1% (5%, 10%).
There are no dramatic changes in the estimates of the other covariates.
The patent stock is still highly positively significant, and the estimated em-
ployment effect remains stable. However, the positive relationship between
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R&D and capital investment becomes statistically insignificant, once we cor-
rect for heteroscedasticity.
To sum up, our findings on entry are in line with our Hp. 1, that is,
investment decreases with the strength of entry threats. Furthermore, we
find that incumbent leaders do not differ in their investment from other
firms (LEADER is insignificant), unless they are threatened by endogenous
entry. Then the negative investment effect is offset (see the positive sign of
the interaction term LEADERi×ENTRYi). Thus, incumbents invest more
than the outsiders under endogenous entry threat. In line with our Hp. 2,
the competitive pressure of the potential entry of other firms induces the
market leaders to invest in R&D more than any other firm.
In economic terms, the findings are also highly significant. Calculating
the expected value of RDINTi for outsiders under no entry threat, yields
(see Greene, 2003, pp. 768-9, for the computation of the expected value in
Tobit models):
E(RDINTi|LEADERi = 0, ENTRYi = 0, X¯i) = 0.98,
where the covariates are taken at the average X¯i.
15 In contrast, the invest-
ment intensity of outsiders under high entry threat only amounts to:
E(RDINTi|LEADERi = 0, ENTRYi = 3, X¯i) = 0.49,
which means R&D intensity reduces by about 51%, all else constant. If a
leader suffers from high entry threat, however, we get:
E(RDINTi|LEADERi = 1, ENTRYi = 3, X¯i) = 0.93,
which corresponds only to a 5% decrease due to entry threat. Statistically,
the leader’s reduction due to entry is not even different from zero. With
respect to our Hp. 2, we confirm the theoretical prediction that leaders
invest more than the average firm under entry threat. Investment of leaders
is about 89% higher (R&D intensity is 0.93% while outsiders only achieve
0.49%).
15Calculations are based on the heteroscedastic estimation of Model III.
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Results on potential feedback from R&D to entry
First, we test if the above mentioned instrumental variables are relevant in the
first stage regression of entry on all covariates and the excluded instruments.
Table 4 shows the partial F-values for the instrumental variables in the first
stage regression.
Then we test for endogeneity of entry in the second stage regression fol-
lowing Smith and Blundlell (1986). They introduced a regression based test
which is basically equivalent to the procedure suggested by Hausman (1978,
1983) for the OLS case.16 Suppose our R&D investment equation is given
by:
y∗i1 = x
′
iβ + αyi2 + ui, (11)
where the possibly endogenous regressor y2 is the entry threat in our case,
and the vector xi denotes the other regressors. Then we write the reduced
form equation for y2 as:
yi2 = z
′
ipi + vi, (12)
where z′i contains the vector x and the other instrumental variables described
above. Once we estimate (12), we obtain vˆi, we can estimate our R&D
equation including the generated residuals from the first stage regression
using Tobit as:
y∗i1 = x
′
iβ + αyi2 + ρvˆi + ei, (13)
The usual t–statistic of ρˆ is a valid test on the endogeneity of y2. If it is not
rejected that ρˆ = 0, we do not find that y2 is endogenous.
Table 4 reports the IV relevance tests from the first stage regression (par-
tial F–statistics), and the Blundell/Smith test on endogeneity of entry based
on the heteroscedastic regressions of Model I (the homoscedastic version led
to the same conclusions).
16See also Wooldridge (2002, pp. 118–120).
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Table 4: IV relevance tests and endogeneity test of entry variable
Test MESt−1 MESt−1,
Defaultt−1
MESt−1,
Defaultt−1,
ADV 2 to
ADV 6
MESt−1,
Defaultt−1,
ADV 2 to
ADV 6 ,
SUB2 to
SUB4
F-Test on IV significance
in 1st stage regression
F(1,1838) =
14.33***
F(2,1837) =
7.51***
F(7,1832) =
4.94***
F(10,1829)
= 8.19***
Blundell/Smith endogene-
ity testa
−0.53 −1.01 −0.67 −0.69
Notes: *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
a Based on heteroscedastic model I. t–statistics of first stage residuals are displayed.
The logic of the result interpretation is as follows. First we find that the F-
statistics on joint significance of our instruments indicate that they are highly
significant in the first stage. They explain a significant share of the variation
in the entry variable, and thus we can conclude that they are relevant in
explaining entry. Based on that, we then compute the Smith/Blundell test
as described above. As can be seen in the table, the hypothesis of exogeneity
of the entry variable in not rejected by any combination of instruments used.
Note that we also tested more combinations of our IV candidates than shown
in Table 4, but the results never changed. We also tested other IVs that are
not mentioned in the text, e.g. the average profitability in the industry, and
the ratio of capital depreciation and total assets at the industry level as a
further proxy for sunk costs. None of these were significant in the first stage
regression explaining entry nor did the Smith/Blundell test reject exogeneity.
As there is no statistical test on the validity of available instruments for
the Tobit case, we additionally just computed he Hansen J–Test (the het-
eroscedasticity robust version of the Sargan test) on overidentifying restric-
tions based on standard 2–stage least squares regressions. The test confirmed
the validity of the instruments as shown in Table 4 except in the last case
where we added the substitutability variables to the list of IVs. The Hansen
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test rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level in this case.
In summary, we found relevant instrumental variables, but the exogeneity
of the entry variable has not been rejected by the tests. Furthermore, we can
also confirm the validity of instruments based on 2SLS regressions using the
Hansen J-Test for several IV combinations. Given these results, we conclude
that the results as presented in Table 3 still hold, and that our two main
hypothesis are thus confirmed: R&D investment decreases with larger entry
threats in general, but leaders invest more into R&D when threatened by
entry.
4 Conclusions
Who does invest in R&D? This article has provided theoretical and empirical
motivations for a relatively surprising answer to this question: market leaders
do invest in R&D more than other firms when they are under the competitive
pressure of endogenous entrants. The immediate consequence is that under
these conditions incumbents are more likely to innovate and therefore to
persist in their leading position. This result suggests that we may have
to change our way of looking at persistent dominance in a technologically
advanced market: this may be the result of strong competitive pressures.
A novel aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the same
firms provide a subjective view on our key determinants of R&D intensity,
the entry pressure and the leadership. Rather than determining arbitrarily
the size and composition of a market, assigning a degree of entry intensity in
a discretionary way, and assigning a status of leadership on the basis of pre-
determined variables, using the questionnaire of the Mannheim Innovation
Panel we allow the firms to identify the size of their main market, the exis-
tence of an endogenous threat of entry in the market and the identity of the
leader in the market. Our empirical approach can be seen as a first attempt
to test the predictions of the endogenous market structures approach and
could be applied to other empirical implications, for instance, on the role of
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leaders in pricing strategies, preliminary investments, financial decisions and
so on.
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Appendix
Table A1: Sample description by industry aggregates
Industry # obs. # leaders Average R&D intensity (in %)
Food 121 13 0.33
Textiles/Leather 97 9 1.21
Paper/Publish 306 23 0.73
Chemicals 132 6 3.50
Rubber 138 9 1.16
Glass/Ceramics 82 11 0.93
Metal Production 61 5 0.63
Metal Fabrication 259 22 1.09
Machinery 222 23 2.68
Electronics 109 7 2.51
ICT 70 3 5.65
Instruments/Optics 172 14 7.10
Vehicles 88 4 2.37
Total 1857 149
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